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This thesis examines the organizational causes of the
Department of Defense's (DoD) inability to acquire working
defense systems. One major cause of this is identified as a
lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced
acquisition personnel. An examination of the definitions of
Decision Support and Expert Systems is made to determine
their suitability for application to this problem. The
information system framework of Gorry and Scott Morton is
used to structure the acquisition problem. The DoD
acquisition problem is found to be a good candidate for the
application of Expert Systems.
An expert system architecture is developed to provide
acquisition personnel both technical and management support.
Use of a central mainframe, connected to the Defense Data
Network will provide nationwide access, with centralized
control of the knowledge base. The architecture allows for
the incorporation of existing conventional software under
expert software control. In order to reduce development
cost and time, the use of existing DoD manuals, as the
knowledge base, is proposed. A prototype module, utilizing
the M.l expert shell and DoD Manual 4245. 7-M and NAVSO
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In 1985, the Washington Post ran a series of articles,
titled Defense INC. , illustrating some of the problems
occurring in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition
system (Washington Post 1985) . These problems range from
excessive requirements, increased Congressional oversight,
and low maintainability, to excessive profits, and unethical
conduct in contracting. In 1985, Secretary Weinberger was
forced to cancel the Division Air Defense (DIVAD) air
defense system after it failed operational testing (Smith
1988:172). In 1988, a scandal erupted involving the alleged
bribery of DoD procurement officials for insider
information. Since its inception and Presidential
announcement, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program
has been embroiled in controversy over its feasibility and
workability (Smith 1988:603-616). Lastly, these problems
and others were perceived to be so bad, and the DoD so
unable or unwilling to fix them, that the Congress stepped
in and mandated changes in the assignment and training of
program management personnel (President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management 1986:28).
These examples illustrate that the DoD is experiencing
problems in trying to develop and procure the complex weapon
systems it needs in the numbers and time frame dictated by
modern technology. This is not to say that these problems
are necessarily new or unique to the 80s. Indeed, defense
fraud has been around since the Revolution, and will be
around as long as people and profit are part of the
procurement process. However, the above headlines do
suggest that a look needs to be taken at the reasons why the
recent scandals have occurred and why it takes ten years or
more to develop a new weapon system that often does not work
as advertised (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986:566).
What makes the DoDs problems so serious is that the
United States (US) is entering an era of limited resources,
both fiscal and industrial, and waste denies critical
amounts of material to the defense forces of the US.
Furthermore, current challenges to US industrial and nuclear
supremacy, mean that any weakening of the US defense
capability can not easily be made up. In light of decreased
US industrial capacity, it is imperative that DoD
procurements minimize their drain on the national economy
while not weakening the defense capabilities of the US (U.S.
Congress, Senate 1986:553). In order to accomplish this, it
is necessary to correct the DoD procurement process so that
it works more efficiently and will therefore require less
resources, both capital, labor, and material.
Another important aspect of US defense capability, is to
improve our ability to use the existing forces in the
inventory. This is the area of Command, Control, and
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Communications (C3) . There is a growing awareness that C3
can be either a significant force multiplier or divider
(Herres 1983:31). This means that the proper C3 can allow a
weaker force to prevail against superior forces and
conversely poor C3 can prevent a strong force from
completing its mission. Therefore, one way the US can
reduce the drain of defense on the national economy is to
possess effective C3 systems.
However, the DoDs problems with procurement also affect
the procurement of C3 systems. This leads to C3 systems
that are developed in time, operate poorly, and contribute
to a lack of effective C3, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of existing US forces. Furthermore, the field
of C3 is very dependent on fast changing computer
technology. Yet this technology is one of the most
difficult to incorporate into weapons systems. Therefore,
in order to increase the effectiveness of existing US
forces, it is critical that C3 systems be developed quickly
and work as planned.
In order to allow the efficient procurement of weapon
systems, and to allow the procurement of effective C3
systems, it is necessary to determine the causes for the
DoDs inability to acquire working defense systems. Only
after the causes are determined is it possible to determine
if a solution can be found. The purpose of this thesis is
to take a careful look at several of the potential
3
organizational causes of this problem. These causes will
then be examined to determine if it is possible to utilize
expert computer systems to assist acquisition personnel in
managing their complex and difficult jobs.
II. PROBLEM AND THEORETICAL BASIS FOR SOLUTION
A. PROBLEM DISCUSSION
A brief description of the Program Manager's (PM's) task
begins this discussion. There have been many attempts to
describe the PM's job, each with varying degrees of
succinctness and clarity. The problem is that the PMs job
deals with every aspect of the project, and definitions try
to include every aspect. One of the best definitions that
the author has found, comes from the Navy Program Manager's
Guide 1987 (Draft) . It states the following description of
the PM's responsibility:
PMs, within their chartered responsibility, shall
exercise technical and business/financial management for
the accomplishment of the program objectives within
approved constraints and thresholds. In order to do
this, the PM will need to develop a broad array of
managerial skills. Many of these skills will have their
locus in the program management organization and support
activities, but certain ones must reside in the PM
himself.
The PM will be the primary advocate for the program.
At the outset, the prospective PM must be thoroughly
convinced of the need which the program addresses before
he takes on the PM responsibility. He must completely
understand the military need for the system and must
become intimately familiar with the system as it
evolves. Since a series of minor decisions can have a
major impact on the program, the PM must understand and
appreciate the implications of each trade-off decision.
(U.S. Department of the Navy 1987:2-1)
What this passage is pointing out, without mentioning
them specifically, is that the PM must be aware of all the
fields of knowledge relating to the design, manufacture, and
5
production of a weapons system. This means he or she must
manage the use of high technology components, design theory,
application, etc. Often the PM is not an expert in any of
these fields. Regardless of this fact, the Manual goes on
to make the most important point about the PM's role:
"The PM must understand that he and he alone is responsible
and accountable for the success or failure of the program."
(U.S. Department of the Navy 1987:2-1).
In order to accomplish this monumental task, and
shoulder this responsibility, the program manager is given a
number of personnel for assistance. With these personnel he
or she must form a management team that is capable of
performing the above task description. These personnel vary
in nature from civilian and military personnel to private
support contractors. Furthermore, the technical,
managerial, and program management backgrounds of these
individuals varies; with the PM being dependent upon the
military personnel system, the availability of a civilian
staff, and the expense of hiring qualified support
contractors. It is with these personnel resources that the
PM must form an effective management team.
Unfortunately, in the past there has been considerable
variance in the expertise and ability of the personnel
assigned to the PM job and his or her staff. In support of
this criticism, in 1985 a staff report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee highlighted this as one of their points
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for improvement (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986:560). And at
the same time the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management reported the following:
. . .The defense acquisition work force mingles civilian
and military expertise in numerous disciplines for
management and staffing of the world's largest
procurement organization. Each year billions of dollars
are spent more or less efficiently, based on the
competence and experience of these personnel. Yet,
compared to its industry counterparts, this work force
is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced. Whatever
other changes may be made, it is vitally important to
enhance the quality of the defense acquisition work
force - both by attracting new personnel and by
improving the training and motivation of current
personnel.
. . .We also support recent legislation that has further
defined career paths for all program managers. In 1984,
Congress established a minimum four-year tenure for
program management assignments. The 198 6 Authorization
Act prescribed requisite qualifications and training,
including at least eight years of acquisition-related
experience and appropriate instruction at the Defense
Systems Management College (or equivalent training)
.
By contrast, much more remains to be done concerning
civilian acquisition personnel generally. Civilians
frequently cite the rigid pay grades and seniority-based
promotion standards of the federal civil service as
disincentives to continued employment. Higher pay and
better opportunities in private industry lure the best
college graduates and the brightest trainees away from
government, particularly in such highly competitive
fields as science, engineering, and contracting....
(President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management 1986:28)
However, the above speaks only in generalities and does
not provide the specific areas in which the personnel are
deficient. In order to determine whether computer based
technology can help, it is necessary to know the specific
types of problems that are occurring. A possible answer is
found in one set of DoD manuals. This is the area of
technical expertise in the specific areas of design,
manufacture, and production. The following extracts from
these manuals identify the problem:
Additionally, we must strive for improvement in the
understanding and the timing of the disciplines of
design, test, and production. Successfully
accomplishing the engineering tasks on schedule is the
important "key" to reducing the risk of a program. This
has a direct and profound impact on the quality of
decisions we make on individual programs, and in my
judgement, has a more immediate and potentially much
greater return on investment in time and effort (and
thereby on both cost and performance as well) . Most
importantly, we can achieve this return on investment
with the application of current policy cited in the
parent document to this Manual (DoD Directive 424 5.7)
and using established procedures within the presently
defined acquisition process. (U.S. Department of Defense
1985:iii)
The industrial processes of design, test, and
production are poorly understood both by the government,
which contracts for them, and industry as a whole, which
developed them. That is, some contractors are
knowledgeable in, and make good use of certain
processes, but no contractor chooses to use them all.
.
As a result, various technical issues in design, test, or
production degrade performance and readiness in service,
not the management issues. (U.S. Department of the Navy
1986:1-1)
Given that there is a problem with getting good people
with the proper training, the next step is to see what types
of problems this lack of experience causes. A list of
typical problems encountered in program management and DoD
acquisition will allow for an analysis to determine possible
causes of the problem. If a strong case can be made that
the cause is due to lack of training, then a specific area
for computer application will have been identified. Below
8
(Table 1) is a typical list of problems cited in Stephanou's
text on program management. In addition, the author's
analysis, showing a logical link to a lack of experience and
or expertise on the part of a PM or his or her staff, is
added. The author does not propose that in each case, the
failure or cause of the problem is solely due to the reasons
developed. Rather these illustrate how a likely cause may
be the lack of experience and or expertise. The author
realizes that there are always other causes that in any
given specific case are more influential than others.
However, in order to improve the acquisition process it is
necessary to try to eliminate those causes that are solvable
and then work from a new level of competence.
Table 1
APPLICATION OF STEPHANOU TO THE INEXPERIENCE PROBLEM
Stephanou's List Author's Arguments
(Stephanou 1985:14)
1. The basis for the project la. The staff and PM do not




lb. The PM and staff do not
understand the acquisition




2. There is a lack of 2a. Due to a lack of under-
management/company support standing on how important
(including money and other support is to the power of
resources)
.
the PM and the perceived
support the PM receives, the
company does not provide
sufficient support.
Table 1
APPLICATION OF STEPHANOU TO THE INEXPERIENCE PROBLEM
(continued)
3 . Tasks are inaccurately
defined.
3a. The PM does not know
what is required to
accomplish the tasks.
3b. The PM does not know
what is to be done next and
does not plan for the tasks
and therefore does not
define them well.
4 . Management techniques/
systems are misused (or not
at all)
.
4a. Because the PM does not
know what is required he or
she does not know what to
manage.
4b. The PM does not know





5a. There is a communi-
cation problem due to a
lack of common under-
standing between engineers
and the PM.
5b. The PM does not under-
stand what information and
or what information systems
he or she needs.
6. There is too much shifting
of personnel owing to changing
priorities.
6a. The PM uses crisis
management vice a planned
management style.
6b. The PM does not know
what comes next in the
project so that he or she
must react rather than
control events.
7. There is failure to take
into consideration the varying
relative importance of
performance, cost, and
schedule during the project.
7a. The PM does not under-
stand the overall process
of acquisition and can not
adjust his or her priori-
ties of performance, cost,
and schedule.
7b. The PM does not under-
stand that mistimed emphasis
on schedule, cost, or
performance can cause
greater problems in the long
10
Table 1
APPLICATION OF STEPHANOU TO THE INEXPERIENCE PROBLEM
(continued)
run, by denying proper study
of a problem to determine a
good solution.
8 . The wrong person is chosen
as project manager.
9. The manager falls prey to
temptations of expediency.
10. Staffing is poor.
11. Project termination is
not planned.
8a. Personnel managers
have no idea of the
requirements for a PM.
8b. No time is allotted for
training a PM before
assuming the job.
9a. Due to a lack of
understandings of the inter-
relationships of system
acquisition, the PM can not
tell when a decision will
impact a later phase.
9b. Due to a lack of
understanding of the inter-
relationships of system
acquisition, the PM succumbs
to pressure from superiors
to expedite items.
10a. The PM does not
understand the fields of
knowledge required and
therefore can not determine
how many personnel are
required to manage the
project.
10b. The PM can not deter-
mine the skill levels
required for each job and




11a. Since the PM does not
understand the acquisition
process, he or she can not
foresee failure (i.e.
termination) coming,
lib. The PM does not have
the knowledge of the process
of termination.
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The above analysis indicates that a logical argument can
be made for the fact that a lack of experience could be the
likely cause of each of the typical problem areas
encountered in program management. The presence of this
inexperience might be attributable to the fact that either
there is not a sufficient number of personnel assigned to a
project, or that the personnel assigned lack the required
training and or expertise. In the author's experience, both
are all too common on most programs. Furthermore, a
combination of these causes is usually present at one time
or another. Whatever the reason, a lack of knowledge seems
to be a main factor that impacts the management of major
weapons systems.
However, a further examination is required to determine
if the causes for inexperience are solvable together. In
the first case, an insufficient number of personnel need to
be able to accomplish the tasks they already know, but do it
faster, and then be given assistance in mastering a new
task. In the second case, there is a sufficient number of
personnel assigned, who need assistance in learning their
tasks because of their lack of knowledge or experience. The
common thread in both of these cases, is that the personnel
involved need assistance in learning new tasks. Therefore,
it appears that a common solution is feasible.
Another way of expressing this is that there is a need
for tools that increase productivity and assist personnel in
12
gaining experience more quickly. These two items are
exactly what computer automation and expert systems can
provide. Therefore, it would appear that the DoD
acquisition system is a perfect area to examine the use of a
Decision Support System/Expert System (DSS/ES) . However, it
is necessary to first examine further the feasibility of
applying DSS/ES systems to the DoD acquisition process based
on the technical aspects of the systems being developed,
deployed, and supported.
B. DSS/ES DESCRIPTION
In examining the use of computers to assist in problem
solving, it is necessary to determine what type of
problem (s) are to be solved. The term, type of problem,
refers to the nature/structure of the problem and not its
subject area. In the previous section, the subject area was
selected. It is now important to look at the structure of
problems from a more general viewpoint, since it will
determine the ability of a computer application to assist a
manager. In the past, computers have been useful for
solving very structured, repetitive tasks, with a largely
numerical basis. It is only recently that computer hardware
and software is being developed to deal with unstructured
problems.
To utilize this fact, a framework is needed to allow for
the classification of problems into a structured or
13
unstructured category. A good framework for determining or
classifying problems was developed by the management
information system discipline. Figure 1 shows this
framework, developed by Gorry and Scott Morton using






































Information Systems: A Framework
(Gorry and Scott Morton 1971:55)
This framework provides a tool for determining the type
of computer application that should be used for a given
problem. In general, the development of specific software
tools that automate and speed up the execution of everyday
tasks and analyses are fairly well under development or
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already exist. The Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC) software packages and commercial packages for such
areas as project management, cost, schedule, etc, work well
when used by a trained staff. These would correlate to the
operational and management control areas for the structured
and semi-structured problems.
However, there exists little in the way of computer
applications that assist in the solution of strategic
planning, unstructured problems. These problems are ones in
which the computer needs to simulate the human mind in an
attempt to solve the problem. They are ill defined, ill
structured, and usually require a large amount of
speculation, and imagination just to formulate the real
problem. In addition to purely isolated strategic planning,
unstructured problems, the author feels that this category
should also include problems involving the integration of
distinct operational or management control, and structured
or semi-structured problem efforts. The reason for this is
that integration of a number of fairly simple tasks, that
are easily automated, often can not be integrated into a
cohesive system due to synergistic, and obscure
interrelationships
.
Since the management and training of personnel to
increase productivity is the problem area selected in this
thesis, it would appear that exploration into the
development and use of computer applications to assist the
15
new PM could be a step in the right direction. Fortunately,
there has been a class of computer applications developed
recently that address these types of problems. They are
called Decision Support Systems (DSSs) and Expert Systems
(ESs) . In order to understand this class of applications it
is necessary to begin with their definitions.
To begin with, R. H. Sprague defines Decision Support
Systems as:
. . .A DSS is a class of information system that draws on
transaction processing systems and interacts with the
other parts of the overall information system to support
the decision making activities of managers and other
knowledge workers in the organizations.... (Sprague
1980:12)
DSSs have grown out of earlier Management Information
Systems (MISs) , in an attempt to develop systems that assist
in the solution of all types of problems. DSSs differ from
the traditional transaction systems in that they are geared
to solving problems that are not deterministic in nature.
That is, there is no single solution, or the problem input
variables have a range of values and therefore, such that
the solution may result in a range of values. The key here
is that the DSS seeks to support the decision maker rather
than produce a single "correct" solution that only needs to
be executed. In this manner, the computer can be used to
provide the decision maker with alternatives based on
various inputs, the decision would then be left up to the
manager based upon his or her evaluation of the
16
alternatives. This evaluation would require an examination
of the tradeoffs in both the input variables and the range
of solution values.
But this description does not explain how a DSS
operates, and without understanding how a system works it is
impossible to know how to apply it correctly. Typically, a
DSS consists of three components: a dialog, data, and a
models subsystem. The user will engage the dialog subsystem
and determine what data is present or required. Then, based
on what decision he or she is attempting to reach, select an
appropriate model and run it based on the existing data and
changes or ranges of interest. In this way, the dialog
subsystem runs the DSS based on the input of the user, and
the data and models are selected and run according to the
needs of the user.
A simple example of this is an interest rate problem.
If the interest rate changes from 10 to 15 percent, how does
that affect a 3 year mortgage payment. The model is the
compound interest formula, and the data is 3 years and 10
to 15% in increments. The DSS may have a fixed or flexible
percent increment, or it may be that the decision maker
wants to first do a course increment (1%) followed by a fine
increment (1/4%) to finalize the decision. In this manner
the user is shown a range of solutions and can see the
impact of changes in the input on the output of the model.
This is a simple example, but one can see how this could be
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combined with other models to decide say whether to buy or
rent a house.
It is the removal of the requirement for a final correct
solution that allows the computer to be applied to problems
that are ill-structured, or ill-defined. This is because
the computer is being asked to do what it does best, compute
many repetitive, scenario calculations for interpretation by
a decision maker. Yet without a DSS, the decision maker
would not always invest the time necessary to investigate
the full range of alternatives available and therefore,
might miss the most promising alternative. Because DSSs use
deterministic models with varying inputs, they are limited
in scope or application only by the models contained by the
DSS.
At the same time as DSSs were being developed,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) was being heavily researched.
One of the results of this research has been expert systems.
These systems are an attempt to mimic human ability in a
specific knowledge area. Don Waterman describes expert
systems as follows:
Expert systems are sophisticated computer programs
that manipulate knowledge to solve problems efficiently
and effectively in a narrow problem area. Like real
human experts, these systems use symbolic logic and
heuristics—rules of thumb—to find solutions. And like
real experts, they make mistakes but have the capability
to learn from their errors. However, this artificial
expertise has some advantages over human expertise: It
is permanent, consistent, easy to transfer and document,
and cheaper. In sum, by linking the power of computers
to the richness of human experience, expert systems
18
enhance the value of expert knowledge by making it
readily and widely accessible. (Waterman 1986:xvii)
The above sounds very exciting, as does all new
technology, however, it is important to understand how
expert systems really work in order to understand what types
of problems they can be used to solve. Typically, an ES
consists of three components: a knowledge base, an inference
engine, and a user interface. The inference engine controls
the process and since the problem is known, searches the
database for appropriate data. Whenever the inference
engine needs data that is not present in the database, the
request is sent to the user via the interface subsystem.
After receiving the user response, the inference either
continues searching or reaches its conclusion.
The main ingredient of an expert system is the knowledge
base. Expert systems use knowledge rules to represent
expert knowledge gathered from an expert. The format of
these rules take on slightly different forms based upon the
application, but almost all current representations are
based on the "IF... THEN..." statement. This statement
allows for the querying of the user for information and
allows the computer to conclude some fact based on the rule.
By concatenating these rules, it is possible to build
systems that guide the user through complex problems and
reach a logical conclusion that fits the input data.
19
Therefore, the user of an expert system will be asked a
series of questions that an expert would ask, and based upon
the responses would be told the conclusions that an expert
would reach based upon the data. This allows for the
replication of expert human knowledge. In addition, by
observing the steps that an expert would follow, the new
user is afforded an opportunity to learn experience at an
accelerated rate. It is for this fact, to assist in
imparting knowledge that most expert systems offer an
explanation feature to allow for the explaining of the
reasons for the question and conclusion.
A simple example of this is a diagnostic problem. If a
car does not start, what are the steps to determine the
cause and can it be fixed? The ES might first ask does the
car crank? Based upon the response the system will branch
to a different set of questions and or actions, i.e. if yes
then check spark, if not then check battery. The question
for the spark alternative might be, Do you have engine
analysis equipment? Based on the response the system would
either say call mechanic (no) or set up and run (yes) . In
this manner the user is guided through the steps that a
mechanic would use to determine the cause of a specific, but
complex, problem; a car not starting. And a user with the
rudimentary skills or knowledge of cars, i.e. what is a
battery, spark, engine analysis equipment, can be shown how
to apply that basic knowledge.
20
The example above is just one example of an ES and its
method of reaching a conclusion. The method of reaching a
conclusion is called the control structure and there are
many different types. The control structure to be used is a
critical choice since it determines how the expert system
will operate and what type of problems the user can expect
the system to solve. It is beyond the scope of this thesis
to describe all of the different types of control systems,
however, Table 2 presents a summary of the various types of
control schemes along with their related uses.
Table 2
CONTROL STRATEGIES THAT ARE COMMONLY APPLIED IN
VARIOUS APPLICATION AREAS
(Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith 1987:83)
CONTROL
STRATEGY APPLICATION











Least-Commitment 1. Applications with
non-effective pruning
rules
2. Applications with Large,
factorable solution space
In studying DSSs and ESs it is difficult to determine
where one begins and the other ends. Indeed, there is
considerable controversy over this point. Are ESs a subset
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of DSSs or are DSSs primitive ESs? A large part of this
controversy arises due to the nature of their development.
DSSs were developed by MIS personnel to assist the decision
makers in their organizations. Therefore, the DSS
developers are close to the user. ESs were developed in the
laboratory and now are seeking to reach decision makers to
prove what they can do. This difference in developmental
origin, has given rise to debate over how to classify these
computer systems. Turban and Watkins give an excellent
synopsis of the opposing views in their paper "Integrating
Expert Systems and Decision Support Systems" (Turban and
Watkins 1985:138-152). In the author's opinion, a
resolution of this conflict is important because it can
determine how DSSs and ESs are designed, supported,
controlled, and introduced into an organization.
Based upon the definition of both systems it appears to
the author that the DSS definition is broader and seeks to
address many more types of problems. The methods of DSS are
not fundamentally powerful or revolutionary. However, they
seek to harness a man to a machine to help interpret more
data in different ways. The success of the application is
largely driven by the man. However, AI has not reached the
state where it can address more than specific problems where
expert knowledge exists. Based upon this state of affairs,
the author prefers the structure that allows for ESs to be a
subset of DSSs. This recognizes that ESs have limitations,
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yet are an important part in developing systems to assist in
decision making. It also realizes that the larger goal is
to determine how to assist all types decisions. Therefore,
the author views expert systems as a subset of DSSs, used
where the intent is to teach or supplement the knowledge of
the user. Since this is exactly the type of problem that is
being addressed, this thesis will use the term expert system
from now on.
C. FEASIBILITY OF USING A DSS/ES
Now that the problem area has been identified and the
theoretical background of DSSs/ESs has been established, the
next step is to determine the feasibility of using an expert
system approach to solving acquisition problems. The
purpose of this section is to determine whether the problem
area is truly suited for having an ES developed. The author
will attempt to follow the discussion of DSS/ESs to show
that at each point DSSs/ESs fit the problem area.
As discussed earlier, the information system framework
of Gorry and Scott Morton (Gorry and Scott Morton 1971:55)
provides an excellent categorization scheme for problems
encountered by managers in any field of endeavor. To show
how this can be applied to DoD acquisition, Figure 2 is
presented as an example of how to apply this framework to
systems acquisition. This figure contains representative
tasks that have been filled in to show typical acquisition
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tasks and their relative structure. This figure is not
intended to be exhaustive; but it does illustrate that the




































(Gorry and Scott Morton 1971:55)
Applied to DoD Acquisition
The next step is to determine what are the prerequisites
for the application of an ES. At first this seems to be a
difficult task, but fortunately there exist several
checklists that enable one to determine when an ES is
appropriate. Both Waterman (Waterman 1986:129) and
Wolfgram, Dear and, Galbraith (Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith
1987:148) provide such lists. Although there is some
overlap in these two lists, the author feels that each
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offers its own advantages. Wolfgram, Dear, and Galbraith's
list is general, in purpose, and addresses all of the
aspects required for an ES. Waterman has provided three
lists, each pertaining to a specific aspect of an ES.
Therefore, Waterman's lists allow for the determination of
what aspect is not being met, almost an ES itself. Both
Waterman's and Wolfgram, Dear, and Galbraith's lists are
provided below, along with the author's argument for
applying them to this problem.
Table 3
APPLICATION OF WATERMAN'S ES REQUIREMENTS TO ACQUISITION
Waterman's List
(All of these are required)
(Waterman 1986:129)
1. Task does not require
common sense.
2. Task requires only
cognitive skills.




la. Acquisition rules are
usually specific and not
general in nature, or
requiring application out
side of the specific area.
2a. Program Management is a
cognitive vice physical
skill.
3a. Experts are able to
generate manuals, therefore
they should be able to
articulate their expertise.
4a. In both industry and
DoD a limited number of
experts are available.
Experts agree on solutions. 5a. There is at least




6. Task is not too difficult,
7 . Task is not poorly
understood.
6a. Acquisition is diffi-
cult, however large,
difficult problems can be
broken up into smaller
units, each with its own ES.
7a. The theory of program
management is well
developed, it is the
application that is lacking.
Table 4
APPLICATION OF WATERMAN'S ES DEVELOPMENT
JUSTIFICATION TO ACQUISITION
Waterman's List
(Only one or more of these
are required)
(Waterman 1986:130)
1. Task solution has a high
payoff.
2. Human expertise being lost
3. Human expertise scarce.
4 . Expertise needed in many
locations.
Author's Arguments
la. Any improvement in
acquisition will have a
large dollar savings,
lb. Payoff due to better
equipment is incalculable.
2a. Government has trouble
attracting and keeping
trained personnel.
3a. Not enough human
expertise exists.
3b. The training of the
acquisition work force was
mentioned earlier in the
Packard Commission Report.
4a. The large number of
military acquisition, spread
over the country requires a
large number of experts.




APPLICATION OF WATERMAN'S E8
CHARACTERISTICS TO ACQUISITION
Waterman's List
(All of these are required)
(Waterman 1986:132)
1. Task requires symbol
ismanipulation
.









Because each program is
different, the knowledge
will be applied or weighted
differently each time, this
requires that the base
knowledge be applied in a
heuristic manner.
Task is not too easy.
Task has practical value
3 Program Management is
complex enough to require
years of training and study.
4 The improvement of
management will improve the
DoD acquisition system,
which in turn will have a
practical value to the
nation.
Task is of manageable size. 5. By breaking the manage-





APPLICATION OF WOLFGRAM, DEAR, AND GALBRAITH'S





1. The problem is well-
defined not too large and not
too small.
2. The domain is reliable,
relatively stable, available,
and complete.
3. The domain is represent-




1. The acquisition process
has been designed to be
modular and hierarchical in
nature so that individuals
can master parts of it.
2. The present acquisition
cycle has been developed to
be reliable and relatively







areenvisioned to be simple
"if... then" rules.
4 . The data required to be
inputted to the expert system
for analysis are reliable,
available, and complete.
4 . There exists a wealth of
published knowledge on this
topic. This knowledge is in






5. The thought process of the
expert is not "common sense".
6. One overall control
strategy is capable of
solving a majority the
domain's problems.
5. There is a lot of
"common sense" in the
application of the DIDs and
Mil-Stds. However, the
tailoring of these to each
particular system requires
the use of expert knowledge.
6. Since the goal of the
acquisition system is to
acquire systems in a well
thought out manner, the
predictive control strategy




APPLICATION OF WOLFGRAM, DEAR, AND GALBRAITH'S
ES REQUIREMENTS TO ACQUISITION
(continued)
7. Users exist. 7. The DoD does not have
enough experts yet purchases
a large amount of equipment
yearly. There exist a large
number of users who require
assistance in the
acquisition of systems.
8. The source of the expertise 8. Experienced and senior
is recognized as an authority military acquisition
on the subject matter and is
readily available.
personnel do exist. They
may have been since
reassigned, but can be
reached. Civilian
acquisition personnel are
easily reached since they do
not move around as much.
9. The knowledge is symbolic
and not data intensive.
10. The application is
bottlenecked by existing
methods, and only a few good
experts exist.
11. Management commitment is
sufficient to support the
application selected and to
allocate the appropriate
amount of time and resources
to the development of the
system.
9. One of the major aspects
of expert acquisition
knowledge is the
relationship of the various
fields to each other. This
is a highly symbolic
problem.
10. The present system is
viewed as too complex and
cumbersome. This is because
few experts exist who
understand and are trained
in the present system. DoD
manpower constraints have




11. With the increased
scrutiny of Congress and
budgetary constraints it has
been recognized that better
ways to do acquisition are
necessary. If a system can




APPLICATION OF WOLFGRAM, DEAR, AND GALBRAITH'S
ES REQUIREMENTS TO ACQUISITION
(continued)
12. If multiple experts 12. There exists one
exist, then the typical domain established, published set
problems can be solved with a of guidelines for
general consensus among the acquisition. Any disputes
experts; otherwise, it is not will be the result of
a viable application. applying these guidelines to
a particular type of
system.
13. The organizational culture 13. Since the purpose of
is sufficiently attuned to acquisition is to bring new
accepting and integrating new systems into use, there
technologies and innovations. exists a ready acceptance to
new methods.
Based upon the above, it would appear that the use of an
expert system holds great promise for helping solve this
problem. However, an important factor in the decision to
acquire any system is the benefit that can be realized from
the use of the system versus the resources utilized in
developing the system. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
accurately forecast the amount of resources required to
develop an expert system. The reason for this is that the
resources required is directly related to the design
utilized. It is therefore difficult to state categorically
what the absolute benefit will be.
However, by surveying the range of resources required to
develop different ESs, it will be possible to get an idea of
what will be required. ESs in general have three main
resource areas; manpower, hardware, and software tools. In
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order to get an estimate of the order of magnitude of an
expert system development Tables 7 & 8 and Figure 3 show
what ESs require in the software and manpower areas. The
hardware costs fluctuate so much that a chart would outdated
as soon as printed.
These tables and figure illustrate that there is
considerable variation in the resources required to develop
an ES. It is therefore not easy to pick one of the above
approaches arbitrarily, since each approach has consequences
that must be considered. Once these design considerations
have been made and an initial system design generated, a
complete benefit analysis can be conducted that will allow
for the easy comparison of cost and benefits.
Table 7
NUMBER OF PEOPLE REQUIRED TO BUILD AN ES
(Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith 1987:153)
1. One or more senior knowledge engineers.
2. One or more knowledge engineers, either novice
or experienced.
3. One or more knowledge paratechnicals (less
training than knowledge engineers, but useful in




5. Project leader (usually a senior knowledge
engineer)
.
6. Programmers, if an AI language is selected, or
if the expert system is to be networked with
other systems or programs.
7. And, of course the expert (s).
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Table 8
TYPICAL ES SOFTWARE COSTS







$6,000-18,000 + hardware +
development
$250-10,000 + hardware +
development
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Figure 3
Development Time Hours/Rule
(Adapted from (Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith 1987:155))
Now that it has been determined that DDSs/ESs fit the
theoretical framework for application to the acquisition
problem, a suitable design architecture and approach should
next be developed. This will further explain the goals of
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the system and the use of it. However, it should be
cautioned that not all problems will be resolvable at this
stage. Indeed it. may be that further examination will raise
more issues that require more study or are unsolvable. This
is because unfortunately, the use, design, and development
of DSS/ES systems is an art that attempts to support and
emulate the most complex processor known, the human mind.
D. ES SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The previous section demonstrated how an ES could be
applied to a DoD acquisition problem such as a lack of
trained and/or experienced personnel. The next step is to
develop a system architecture for an ES to solve this
problem. However, there is one more point that must be
discussed before developing an architecture, since it
directly impacts on the ability of the ES to be developed
efficiently and operate effectively. The DoD acquisition
system is extremely complex and therefore too large in scope
for an ES to handle.
Both Wolfgram, Dear, and Galbraith (Table 6 #1) and
Waterman (Tables 3 #6 and 5 #5) state that a problem must be
manageable in size for an ES to be developed.
Unfortunately, the problem of trying to build an ES for all
of DoDs acquisition problems is too large for an ES. This
is due to the large number of specialty fields involved with
any given acquisition. This would mean that the ES would
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have to deal with such diverse fields as cost analysis,
electronics, spare parts, and contracting. In addition, the
ES would have to support the PM and his or her staff.
Somehow, the scope of this problem must be pared down before
a realistic ES architecture can be developed.
A partial solution to this size problem comes from an
analysis of the typical organizational structure of a
program office in the context of the information system
problem framework. At the top is the Program Manager.
Working directly for him, are personnel dealing with the
various specialties required to develop the system, such as
software engineering, cost analysis, Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) , hardware engineering, and systems
engineering. Not usually working directly for the PM, but
equally important, is the contracting office. Therefore,
the typical PM office is organized in a two tier system; the
top level consists of the PM, with the second level
supporting the technical areas. These two levels correspond
almost one-to-one with the information system operational
and management control problem structure.
This is an important point because it allows the
acquisition problem to first be segregated into two levels.
The first level would correspond to the operational control
level, and would support the PMs staff. The second level
would correspond to the management control level, and would
support the PM himself. Therefore, developing an ES with
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two levels, the operational and the management control
levels, would fit the typical acquisition staff. It also
makes the PM support portion of the problem more manageable
in size.
However, the staff support portion is still too large to
be manageable. Once again, however, the problem is
structured so as to provide a solution. Currently, these
support fields are considered to be isolated in their
applications. In the author's opinion, this is one of the
main faults with the implementation of the acquisition
system, the lack of a systems approach. However, while not
optimal, the present approach, does allow for the
partitioning of the support staff level into separate units,
with an independent ES for each. This is a first order
approach and does not solve the problem completely. But it
allows a familiar setting to be retained, thus facilitating
acceptance and use, and allows for the problem to be broken
up into manageable increments. Lastly, it provides for the
increase in the knowledge of the current workers.
An example will illustrate the current manner in which
program offices work and the way a "first order" ES will
support it. The systems engineer is responsible for the
application of Mil-Std 490, the standard governing the
development of the system specification. If the Mil-Std is
correctly applied, which the system engineering ES will help
ensure, it does not interfere with the software engineers
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application of Mil-Std 2167 , the standard governing software
development. The software engineering ES will also help
improve the manner in which Mil-Std 2167 is applied.
Therefore, a "first order" ES structure would accept the
current practise of supporting each support discipline as
separate. This support would be a series of modules such as
that of Figure 4. The PM would have a module that assists
both in the management of the staff and the progress of the
program. This approach will allow for the increased
training of existing personnel, and will allow for a better
exploration of the interrelationships between the
disciplines. The follow-on or "second order" structure
would then support these interrelationships between the
support disciplines and would resemble that illustrated in
Figure 5.
Based on the author's experience, this approach not only
breaks the support problem into manageable units, it also
makes the problem feasible from a technical viewpoint. This
is due to the fact that the synergistic effects of related
disciplines are the most difficult to identify. Indeed, it
is almost impossible to get the "experts" to agree on what
the effects are because each expert is colored by their own
background and experience. The ILS expert feels that all
synergistic effects are due to the improved support of ILS.
Therefore, to attempt to solve both the lack of base
knowledge problem and the synergistic effects problem will
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be vastly more difficult. In the author's opinion, the DoD
has not reached the point where the synergistic effects of
acquisition can be determined. Only by first getting enough
personnel trained and properly supported, at a minimum level
of competence, will it be possible to gain the knowledge
base that will allow for the determination of the
synergistic effects of these disciplines.
It should be noted that the above structure does not
address the strategic planning level of decisions. This is
not an oversight, but a realism that in the area of
strategic planning for acquisition there are too many
political factors that change constantly and will not allow
for an easy development of a system to support strategic
decisions. In this area it is arguable that there are no
experts to provide the information, because no standard
method is used to select weapon systems and decide resource
allocation. Therefore, this paper will not address the use
of DSS/ESs in solving strategic planning issues.
After accepting the structure of Figure 4 as a basis for
the development of an acquisition ES, the next step is to
determine what further requirements are needed to produce a
workable structure. Although each module will have unique
specific attributes, it turns out that each of the




The first characteristic is that each module will be a
combination of conventional and expert software. There is
no need to recreate the large amount of conventional
software that has been developed. Furthermore, there are
tasks best suited for solution by conventional software.
This is not a problem, since current ES technology allows
for the interface with some conventional software, and at
the least the reading of files of data. Therefore, each
module should be considered to be a system of both
conventional and ES software tools. The eventual goal
should be to integrate these into a single package under the
control of an ES. But for now, during the first order
development, it is more important, easier, and efficient to
build an ES that relies on the manual execution of other
software tools for inputs.
The second point is that the first order implementation
should rely on existing DoD documentation for its rule base.
To this extent, the ESs should be a collection of smaller
ESs each based on a particular Mil-Std, Military
Specification, or DID. The only attempt at integration of
these should be a codification of the existing relationships
between these documents, i.e. DIDs to Mil-Stds, or the time
phase requirements for them, i.e. C specifications, which
specify product requirements, cannot be delivered before B
specifications, which specify development requirements. The
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rationale for this is again to get the basic knowledge out
now to improve the quality of work.
The third point is that the each of the modules will
consist of two parts. The first part will deal with the
management of the personnel assigned to work in that
discipline. For the PM, this module would provide support
for managing his or her staff. For a particular discipline,
this module would assist in managing the discipline staff,
if one exists, or assist the individual expert in managing
his or her work. This portion of these modules will consist
of time management tools, action item tracking, management
aids, etc. The second part will deal with area of
expertise. This portion of the module will be a combination
of expert and conventional, already developed software.
This combination will help the individual PM or staff member
determine the technical status of the discipline or overall
program.
A final issue in determining a satisfactory structure
for the ES architecture is the user environment. There are
two primary influences that the user environment imposes on
the system. The first of these requirements is
accessibility. The DoD acquisition system operates all over
the country, with PMs in varying locations. In addition,
the PM needs to interact with a number of different
organizations, such as service agencies, in-plant
representatives, auditors, and contractors. Usually, these
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agencies are scattered around the country. Logically, this
requires a system that is either portable or else provides
nation wide access. The second requirement is to ensure the
continued correctness and consistency of the advice given by
the ES, to all users. In order for the ES to accomplish
this, there must be a standardization of the application of
directives to the acquisition process. This requires
control over the knowledge base. To allow for each user to
modify or develop their own ES would circumvent the limited
number of experts in DoD and perpetuate the current system.
In order to meet these two requirements, the ES
structure must allow for control of the knowledge base and
provide either portability or nation wide access. The
easiest and most obvious solution, is the use of laptop
computers. In this case the ES would be designed to run on
a laptop computer and provide the PM and staff with advice
wherever they are. While such a system provides
portability, it creates a major problem in configuration
control of the knowledge base. This solution runs the risk
of allowing the knowledge base to quickly become outdated,
with a very difficult problem of issuing changes.
A better solution is to create a central mainframe
computer system that contains the knowledge base and allows
for the access via a modem. Such a system could allow for
the ES to be either run on the mainframe or downloaded to a
personnel computer (laptop or desk model) . This would allow
40
for easy control of the knowledge base, but would require
substantial modem engineering and phone costs. However, the
use of the Defense Data Network (DDN) would eliminate the
requirement for modem engineering and phone costs.
Therefore, the mainframe should be connected to the DDN to
allow any user of DDN to access the ES. This architecture
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III. EXPERT SYSTEM (ES) DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to develop more fully the
ES system structure in its final form. To this end, this
section will explore the issues of what hardware and
software should be selected, how it will be set up, used,
and maintained. This section is written with the networked
dial-up structure in mind, however, this is only a
preliminary structure. Therefore, issues are explored with
this in mind, but in some instances no conclusion can be
reached without further design and prototyping.
This section was originally developed as part of an
unpublished paper for a course at the Naval Postgraduate
School (Drake and Minnema 1988:4-18). This paper was the
joint effort of the author and LT Robert G. Drake, USN.
This section was reedited by the author for inclusion in
this thesis and was not reviewed by LT Drake.
B. HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The architecture selected for the ES and any additional
user requirements determine the necessary capabilities of
the hardware. To recap, the selected ES architecture is one
of a central mainframe, containing the program and knowledge
base, connected with a remote set of users. Each user will
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access the central computer via a modem and download the
program and knowledge base. The user will then run the ES
on his or her Personal Computer (PC) . In order for this
structure to be accepted by users, one additional
requirement is necessary, speed. Users will balk if the
system takes a long time to access, download or execute.
However, this brief description is not sufficient to allow
for the selection of hardware. Each of these general
requirements must be more fully developed in order to allow
the generation of a selection criteria for the hardware.
The use of a mainframe is based on two conflicting
requirements; speed for the user and centralized control for
the Department of Defense (DoD) . Both of these requirements
are important. Control is required because DoD policies
change and these changes must be promulgated and implemented
quickly and easily. In addition, a goal of the DoD is to
standardize acquisition directives and to ensure compliance
across the entire DoD acquisition system. Therefore having
many versions or customized versions (tailored by
non-experts) of the acquisition ES would defeat this goal.
However, the user needs speed so that he or she can expect a
near real-time decision aid. This is a very critical factor
for the acceptance and use of the system.
The use of a central mainframe allows for both of these
requirements to be met. The central mainframe will only be
required to perform fetches of the programs and rule for the
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users. This allows for speed, since the program is
downloaded to the user's machine and run there. This also
allows for centralized control of the rule base by the DoD
acquisition policy makers. In this manner, control of
changes to the rule base can be validated and approved prior
to implementation. It also ensures that all acquisition
managers will have access to the most current data and
regulations. "I didn't know about that regulation!", will
no longer be an acceptable excuse.
Therefore, the requirements of the central database
computer can be summarized as 1) have easy modem access, 2)
large online memory capability, 3) suitable security of the
database, and 4) to be able to act, for a limited number of
users, as a user terminal. The first is to prevent users
from having to struggle to get access to the database. The
second is to allow for the rapid retrieval and storage of
both current and old versions of the rule base. This is a
requirement since acquisitions started under one set of
guidelines seldom can afford to change to a new of rules set
during the acquisition process. The third is to prevent
unauthorized access and tampering of the rules. The fourth
is to allow for ease of development, testing, and
implementation of new versions of the system.
Unfortunately, these requirements cannot be quantified until
an estimate of the program size is made. However, these
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qualitative requirements are sufficient to indicate the
types of hardware that could be suitable.
As with the mainframe, the requirements of the user
hardware are difficult to predict before a prototype is
developed. This comes from the fact that for speed in
running complex ESs it is sometimes necessary to utilize
symbolic machines, vice standard Von Neumann machines.
These machines would represent a significant cost to the
development of the system and would limit the use of the
system since new users would have to purchase new hardware
before using the system. Therefore, unless the speed of
conventional personal computers is totally unacceptable, it
would be best to utilize them as the user terminals.
Regardless of the speed issue, four user hardware
requirements can be determined: 1) high speed modem
capability, 2) large online memory or online storage, 3)
graphics capability, and 4) hardcopy ability. The first is
to gain access to the database. The second is to allow fast
storage and retrieval of the downloaded database and allow
room for execution. The third is to provide an easy
interface for the user (see interface section) . The fourth
is to provide a permanent record of assistance and plans
developed with the use of the system (Wolfgram, Dear &
Galbraith 1987:95).
In summation, hardware must be capable of supporting the
ES architecture selected. The structure for the ES is a
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central mainframe with user PCs connecting via modems.
Based upon this architecture, it is possible to determine
four qualitative requirements for both the mainframe and
user terminals. However, these requirements can not be made
quantitative until an estimate of the size of the ES
software is made. However, these qualitative requirements
do allow for hardware planning to begin.
C. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
In the development of conventional software, the term
software development deals with every aspect of the software
project. In the development of ESs the term software
development takes on a slightly different meaning. Because
of its importance, the knowledge base is considered
separately. Therefore, software development in ESs is used
to discuss the management of the software vice the actual
contents of the code. Therefore, this discussion of
software development will concern itself with two issues.
These are the choice of a development approach, and the
selection of a set of development tools and or languages.
Once the hardware is preliminarily determined, it is
necessary to consider the software approach to be used
during the development. According to Pressman (Pressman
1987:19-27) there are two main development paradigms for
software. One is the classic and the other is the prototype
or evolutionary approach. The classic approach is best
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suited for problems where the requirements can be determined
completely apriori (Alavi and Napier 1984:65). The
evolutionary approach is best suited for those problems
where the end goal is known but the methodology is not known
or there is more than one manner in which to achieve the end
goal.
In order to choose between these two approaches it is
necessary to consider certain software development policies
of the DoD acquisition process. Unfortunately, DoD
acquisition normally requires an classic approach to
developing software. A strict interpretation of this
approach has been shown to be the least satisfactory method
of developing expert and decision support systems (Hogue and
Watson 1984:76; Waterman 1985:135). However, DoD software
regulations do not prohibit the use of prototypes. They
only require that the use of prototypes be planned for and
that the final system be fully tested prior to deployment.
It is therefore planned to use a hybrid of the two
approaches that will allow for the efficient development of
the ES, and yet deliver structured, and maintainable
software.
To implement the hybrid approach for modules, it is
proposed that the prototype approach be used for initial
module development and testing. Upon completion of the
prototype, a shift to the classical approach would occur.
This will allow for the exploration of different types of
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development tools, languages, methods of data
representation, and interfaces. Most of these aspects of
the system can not be specified prior to preliminary data
acquisition and interviews with the experts. There would be
no limit to the number of prototypes other than cost,
schedule, and the skill of the module development team. The
culmination of the prototype stage will be the completion of
an informal performance test devised by the module team.
Upon completion of the initial module testing, development
would shift to the classic approach with its detailed design
specifications. The module would then be developed in the
approved final language, using specified development tools
and subjected to formal acceptance testing.
To extend this approach to the entire system, it is
proposed that a two stage approach be used. In the first
stage, all modules will be developed separately and
concurrently by individual development teams, including the
PM module. This will allow for the development of a minimum
capability system in the shortest amount of time. In the
second stage, the modules will be reworked to incorporate
any additional knowledge discovered during the first stage.
During the second stage, the PM module will be the one
requiring the most modification. The rationale for this
approach is to allow for the discovery of all potential
interrelationships between the modules before attempting to
develop the final versions. In the author's opinion, it is
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highly likely that the development of the first stage
modules will demonstrate or discover new key aspects of the
management of DoD acquisitions. In any event, it will allow
the developers to become more familiar with the problem
before they start trying to integrate the functional areas.
The other aspect of software development to be
considered is the type of development tools and languages to
be used. In earlier development of ESs, specialized
languages were written that were more suited to the
representation of knowledge and execution of expert rules.
Although these languages are extremely powerful and quick in
execution, they usually require an experienced programmer
and require more development time for the ES . Recently,
there have been a large number of ES tools developed to
shorten the development time and to allow more novice
programmers to develop expert software.
These recent development tools can be classified into
three categories: expert languages, expert shells, and
prepackaged commercial applications. Expert languages are
updated versions of the original languages. Using them
means that all tools, interfaces, and parts of the ES will
have to be developed from scratch. Expert shells are an
attempt to establish a basic ES that will support any
knowledge base installed. This significantly reduces the
development time for the system, but usually is restricted
to one type of control mechanism. The prepackaged
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applications range from entirely developed ESs, to
development tools, such as those used to extract the
knowledge from the experts. Depending upon the application,
it may be possible to purchase already developed systems or
to buy the shell and an interviewer package that will
generate the knowledge base.
The choice of one of the above tools is dependent upon
the ES characteristics. Unfortunately, at this point in the
planning it is impossible to determine the control mechanism
or the complexity of the knowledge base. Therefore, the
only arguments that can be made are for speedy development,
reduced development cost, and ease of maintenance. Based
upon these requirements, it is proposed to use ES shells and
if necessary an expert interviewing system. ES shells will
support the rapid development of the first stage modules,
and if necessary can be replaced or augmented during the
second stage of development.
In summation, ES development requires a choice of the
development approach to be used. From the two major schools
of development thought, a hybrid approach is developed.
This approach will allow for a rapid development by
utilizing prototyping combined with informal testing. Upon
completion of the prototyping stage a formal development
stage will be started. In order to support this approach
the use of ES shells will be used to support the development
of the ES.
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D. KNOWLEDGE BASE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The most important part of an ES is the knowledge base
(Goul and Tongue 1987:450). Therefore, particular care must
be paid to its development. In considering the knowledge
base of an ES it is necessary to discuss four topics: the
types and structure of available knowledge, the sources of
the knowledge, how the knowledge is to be extracted, and the
control mechanism.
For the DoD acquisition problem, there are two types of
knowledge: general acquisition knowledge and specific
application knowledge. The first type deals with general
methodology knowledge that explains how to acquire any
system. The general acquisition type of knowledge is
represented by the regulations and documents pertaining to
all DoD acquisitions. Examples of this are the software
development standards, Data Item Descriptions (DIDs).
,
systems engineering manuals, and federal acquisition
regulations. The second type deals with the specific
application of acquisition knowledge to a specific program
or type of program. That means that the application of
acquisition knowledge to the procurement of electronic
equipment is different from the application to the
procurement of ammunition. The specific acquisition type of
knowledge is represented by Military Handbooks, Manuals, and
experts. It is the specific application knowledge type that
contains the most expertise knowledge.
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The use of these knowledge types depends upon the source
of the knowledge and the development stage of the ES. The
general knowledge is readily available in the published DoD
directives, standards, specifications, etc. The specific
knowledge is spread between published manuals, such as
military handbooks, and human experts. During the first
stage of ES development, the general knowledge will be used
to provide a minimum capability and to raise the level of
expertise in DoD acquisition personnel. During the second
stage, the specific knowledge, along with the knowledge
gained during the first stage, will be incorporated into the
ES . With this approach, a general knowledge base can be
developed quickly, allowing the specific knowledge base to
be built on a solid, working, foundation.
The method of extracting the knowledge depends on its
source. The extraction of knowledge from the general
knowledge category will be done by the knowledge engineers
researching their particular functional area. Because the
specific knowledge category consists of both manuals and
humans, a combination approach is required. Research by the
knowledge engineers, to determine appropriate published
material, combined with an initial survey of experts, to
determine other relations, will be utilized. Personnel
presently in acquisition billets will be the initial
survees.
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Some further description of the survey process is
necessary in order to provide the reader a full
understanding of its purpose. The purpose of this survey is
to get an idea of the scope of material and types of sources
that the experts feel are important. One portion of the
survey will also include a request to list other "experts".
Upon completion of the survey, use of an automated expert
knowledge tool will be used to extract a deeper level of
expertise. The data from the survey will be use to set up
the interview software. Lastly human interviews will be
used as a final step in extracting difficult or
contradictory knowledge from the experts. Since acquisition
experts deal with documentation and people it is envisioned
that the interview method will be most satisfactory.
It is possible for the above approach to be
misinterpreted as to the content of the knowledge base. The
purpose of the ES is to raise the knowledge level of DoD
acquisition personnel. This should not mean the automation
of all of the acquisition standards. This would create a
large, inefficient, and overwhelming ES . The approach
should be for ES to describe what manuals are important and
why. In this way the knowledge engineers can develop a
system that contains the minimum factual data with
references to the remaining published information. This
will prevent the system from being cluttered with pure
factual data that is already available. However, if certain
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standards are deemed prerequisites by the knowledge
engineers, they will be included in the system.
The selection of a control mechanism is dependent upon
how the user wants to use the knowledge. The same problem
and knowledge base can be used in various manners, each of
which require a different control structure. For DoD
acquisition, there are two primary approaches used in the
management of programs. The first is to assist programs
already in progress. This entails the use of the ES in a
diagnostic manner, requiring a backward chaining control
mechanism. The second is to assist in the planning of a
program. This is a forecasting or "what if" manner,
requiring a forward chaining control mechanism. These
mechanisms can be used in the same ES by prompting the user
to state what the session is for, planning or
troubleshooting. Therefore, the ES should, as much as
possible, incorporate both of the control mechanisms.
In summation, the development of the ES knowledge base
requires determination of the types of knowledge, the
sources of the knowledge, the extraction of the knowledge,
and the control mechanism. In DoD acquisitions two types of
knowledge exist, general and specific. The sources of this
knowledge are found in published documents and human
experts. The methods of extraction of this knowledge will
be research and surveys of experts. Finally, the control
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mechanism will support both the planning and the
troubleshooting of DoD acquisition programs.
E. NETWORK DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
In order for the DoD to use a common ES, the use of a
network was decided to be the best solution. In particular,
the Defense Data Network (DDN) was cited as an existing
network for potential use. The purpose of this section is
to discuss the ES requirements of a network, and document
the advantages of using DDN. The DoD acquisition ES imposes
two requirements of the network: allow access to the ES and
support the ES interface. The advantages of using DDN will
be seen as a substantial benefit to the ES.
Access can be characterized in terms of three things:
complexity of connection, difficulty of use, and cost.
Complexity of the connection means the hardware and software
required to allow use of the network. Some networks require
special lines, along with expensive interface equipment to
allow communication. Difficulty of use deals with the
training required to allow the user to access the network.
This is a combination of the hardware and software and
reflects the simplicity and reliability of both. The cost
is a function of the hardware, software, and operating
expenses. That means that if there is a connection or usage
cost for the network (i.e., phone call charge, central
processing unit time charge, etc) it must be considered.
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The use of DDN will allow for maximum access to the ES
system. DDN is designed to allow users with standard phone
modems to access the network. These modems are fairly
cheap, use a standard interface, have high speed (12 00
baud)
,
and fit in most PCs. These modems are easy to use
and many users already are already experienced in their use.
Furthermore, the DDN is structured with local access points
nationwide, eliminating expensive toll calls to a central
location. Therefore, the use of DDN offers an optimum
tradeoff in the three areas characterizing access.
Support of the ES interface can be characterized by two
items: support both text and graphics, and allow the
transmission of program code. The requirement of text and
graphics is due to the nature of the knowledge base.
Presently the DoD uses text and graphics to explain
relationships and knowledge about acquisition programs.
Therefore, the ES must provide this interface in order to be
accepted. A textual interface is standard to any network,
however a graphics capability is not. However, since the
execution of the ES is envisioned to be on the user
terminal, the network need only support the transmission of
the graphics information in a form usable by the user
terminal. This may require conversion from one terminal
form to another. The requirement for the transmission of
program code comes from the decision to utilize a central
mainframe. Current versions of the ES along with data will
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be required to be sent to the user for execution on the user
terminal. Therefore, a fairly rapid capacity to transmit
programs is required.
The use of DDN will provide the interface support
required by the ES. The DDN already supports textual and
graphical interface. The graphical interface requires
knowledge about the terminal in use, but once the terminal
is identified, DDN performs all required conversions.
Furthermore, DDN was also designed for the high speed
transmission of files. These files can contain data, or
programs, and are transmitted unaltered. This means that
programs can be transmitted and upon receipt, will be ready
to run on the user's machine. DDN supports several
different protocols for the downloading of files.
Several further advantages come from the use of DDN.
Networking can play an important role in the development of
the ES. By allowing the ES to come to the experts in their
own familiar work environment, it will save the experts time
in travel and promote a more cooperative atmosphere. By
allowing easy interface between developers and experts,
cooperation during the development, and testing of the ES
will be enhanced. Since most large Government contractors
and installations already have, or can get, access to the
DDN, the cost of this solution would be minimal.
In summation, the DoD acquisition ES imposes two
requirements on the network. These requirements are to
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provide access and support the ES interface. Access is a
function of connection requirements, ease of use, and cost.
The ES interface requires support of text and graphics, and
the transmission of programs. DDN is capable of meeting
these requirements, and offers several other advantages.
F. INTERFACE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
One of the more important development issues is the type
and quality of the ES interface. The overall effectiveness
of the system may be determined by the frequency of its use
and the accurate interpretation of the information
displayed. "A well designed dialog component does not
guarantee the success of a DSS, but it is a necessary
ingredient." (Sprague and Carlson 1982:217). However, the
judgement of an interface is very subjective to the
particular user or class of user. Therefore, the
development of the interface must be on a sound basis and be
responsive to the requirements of the user. In order to
ensure this, the development of the ES interface will deal
with the three parts of an interface, and the style of the
interface.
Physically, the user interface consists of three parts,
the Action Language, the Presentation Language, and the User
Knowledge Base (Bennett 1977:3-11). The action language
deals with how the user can control the system. That is
does the interface allow the user to type on a keyboard, or
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use a mouse, or speak to control the actions of the system.
The presentation language deals with how the system presents
information to the user. That is does the interface present
information to the user on a screen, via a printout, or an
audio output. The knowledge base deals with what the user
must know in order to in order to use the system. This does
not refer to the users knowledge of the interface, but
rather the knowledge the user needs to solve the problem.
An example of this would be that the system expects a user
to be conversant in the problem field and therefore, answers
are not explained in lay terms.
The acquisition ES interface will fit this same
structure. The action language will be either a keyboard or
mouse depending upon the user terminal . These two are
selected due to their already wide application and relative
inexpense. The presentation language will consist of screen
displays consisting of text and graphics, with a printer
output option to provide a hardcopy record of the session.
These mediums are selected due to their use in the
management of acquisition systems. The knowledge base will
be kept to a minimum. This is due to the fact that a main
goal of this system is to educate and train acquisition
personnel. It therefore does no good to require a user to
already be knowledgeable about acquisition in order to use
the ES. The selection of these physical characteristics
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should provide a familiar interface to users, which in turn
will make the acceptance of the system more likely.
Another dimension of the interface, that impacts all
three parts of the interface, is the concept of "dialogue
style" . The style determines the manner in which the three
physical parts of the interface will be used. Therefore,
the style is important since certain styles have limitations
that make them suitable only to certain problem structures.
Sprague and Carlson point out that there are many types of
styles and many combinations of them (Sprague and Carlson
82:199). Each style or combination of styles must be
evaluated for potential tradeoffs before being selected for
a particular application.
However, Sprague and Carlson do cite four examples of
styles that, in the author's opinion, cover the majority of
present day ESs. These four styles are the
questions/answer, command languages, menus, and input
form/output form. The question and answer style is simply
that the system or user poses a question and the answer is
then provided. The command language style requires the user
to enter specific commands to control the system, an example
of this is PC Disk Operating System (DOS) . The menu style
allows the user to select a command from a list via the use
of a simple input medium, i.e., number, mouse, letter. The
input form/output form language style requires the user to
enter information in a "fill in the blanks" manner. An
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example of this is spreadsheet calculations, the information
is entered in the blank or cell located in the form.
The style of acquisition ES will be a combination of two
of the above styles, the menu and question and answer
styles. The menu style will be utilized to control the
system. The menu style reduces the amount of training
required for a new user and provides for most visible means
of system control . Once control is passed to an expert
session the question and answer style will be used. This
style is the natural style of consulting with experts. The
expert must have specific types of information, known only
to the expert, and the user provides it. It is therefore
only logical to use the same approach when dealing with a
system that is trying to replicate an expert. This
combination of styles will allow for an easy to use control
system and an effective and familiar consulting style.
In summation, the interface of the ES can be a very
important aspect of the use and acceptance of the system.
In the discussion of the interface, a three part structure
is utilized. The envisioned structure of the acquisition ES
discussed in these terms. A further dimension of the
interface, the style is also discussed. Using this
discussion, the control and consulting style of the ES is
determined. The result is an interface that will provide
the user with a familiar interface that will assist the ES
in being utilized and accepted.
61
G. VALIDATION
The validation of ESs poses several unique problems.
Since ESs attempt to duplicate human problem solving
techniques, they are difficult to test in a deterministic
manner. Therefore, no series of tests will allow for the
determination of whether an ES works correctly or not.
Simply put, ESs deal with problems that have no right or
wrong answer. Therefore, any evaluation of the system will
require the use of experts to determine the correctness of
the system (O'Leary 1986:470). Yet lack of a validated ES
can lead to a lack of confidence in the system or worse, a
system that makes mistakes.
In order to develop a validation scheme that will
prevent this, it is necessary for the validation process to
support, not hinder the development process. Therefore, the
validation scheme must be technically sound, yet support the
development approach selected. For the acquisition ES, a
further requirement is that the validation scheme support
the centralized control of the knowledge base. A validation
scheme that accomplishes these things will allow for the
determination of the quality of the ES.
There are two approaches used to validate ES software.
These are an informal and formal validation. Informal
validations, usually do not have a firm set of evaluation
criterion, but are used to determine if the design approach
is headed in the right direction. An example of this would
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be review of the rule base with the expert to ensure that
the order of execution is correct. Formal validations are
structured with a predefined set of evaluation criterion and
usually are invoked at the conclusion of a milestone in the
development process. An example of a formal validation is
the acceptance of a display module for incorporation into
the ES. The display module will have a requirement to
accept information in a defined format and display that
information in a specified user format (Wolfgram, Dear &
Galbraith 1987:157).
Even with these validations, it is difficult to
determine the pass or fail criterion of the ES. Seldom will
all of the experts agree on the application of their
expertise in all of the test scenarios. One approach to
overcome this, is to use a certain percentage of the experts
agreeing that the system operates appropriately as the pass
or fail criterion. Presently, a 90-95% level of consensus
is discussed in the literature. However, an important
measure of effectiveness for an ES is the amount of time
that it saves the users. Therefore, any pass or fail
criteria must try to measure, or at least take into account,
the increases or decreases in training time, work time, or
performance.
The above two approaches must also be combined with the
development approach and goals of the ES. The development
approach has been defined as one of a concurrent iterative
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development of modules. Furthermore, the goal of the system
is to provide education, and assistance to acquisition
personnel leading to a standard application of DoD
acquisition directives. Therefore, it is planned to have a
series of informal validations during the development of
modules and a formal validation of each module upon
delivery.
The informal validations held during the development of
modules will utilize the experts who provided the knowledge.
However, the last informal validation will utilize typical
users in a series of case scenarios. The use of newly
graduated students from the Defense System Management
College (DSMC) courses is one possible source. The use of
these students offers an excellent opportunity to utilize
unbiased, motivated, potential users, who have a rudimentary
level of acquisition knowledge. The feedback received will
provide the final test of the modules ability to be used,
and assist new PMs.
For the formal validation procedure, it is proposed to
utilize the the DoD acquisition policy makers. The DoD
acquisition policy makers will be used as reviewers of the
case scenarios results to determine if the ES accurately
implements the present DoD acquisition policy. This will
minimize the drain on the policy makers time and yet ensure
that the system does not guide acquisition personnel into
violating DoD policy. Furthermore, the use of the policy
64
makers as the final reviewers will ensure their support of
the ES and will send an important message to acquisition
personnel that the system is approved for use.
In summation, the validation of ESs is a difficult yet
important task that usually requires more validation steps
than conventional software. Furthermore, it is difficult to
determine the pass or fail criterion for the system. A
consensus percentage of experts is one method that can be
used. For the acquisition ES, the use of DSMC students
along with DoD acquisition policy makers will provide a
suitable set of experts that will validate the ES.
H. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
ESs are adaptive and iterative in their development and
they are never static (Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith 1987:161).
In addition, DoD acquisition policies are constantly
changing and therefore, force the ES to be modified in order
to remain current. Because of this, maintenance of ES will
be required and probably will require a substantial effort.
Therefore, the maintenance of any ES software should also be
considered during the design and development stages. The
lack of this planning will result in a system that is only
usable until a change is required and then an entirely new
system will have to be developed. On the other hand a
system built considering a well thought out maintenance
concept, will be easy to improve and keep current.
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There are two main issues to consider in planning the
maintenance of an ES. The first issue is the standard
software maintenance problem of the choice of development
tools, selected programming language, and the required skill
of the maintainer (s) . The second issue is control of the
expert knowledge base. Put another way, who are the experts
that decide the system is in error and requires fixing?
This is a problem peculiar to ESs and is vital if the ES is
to support the DoD acquisition problem in a uniform,
homogeneous manner.
The acquisition ES has taken the first issue into
consideration as much as is possible at this stage. The
previous consideration of the various development tools
selected the ES shell as the most productive tool. These
shells are readily available from commercial sources. The
use of a commercial ES shells should reduce the required
number of programmers for maintenance. The use of a shell
will also reduce the knowledge requirements of the
programmers since they will be utilizing a standard
development tool, and not having to design a new one for
support. Therefore, the development strategy for this ES
satisfies the support requirements of software maintenance.
The development of an approach to satisfy the second
issue is more difficult. This is because of the additional
maintenance requirements of an ES. Both conventional and
expert software maintenance requires an activity to perform
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the standard functions of troubleshooting, research, coding,
debugging, and configuration control. However, ESs also
require access to a group of experts in order to allow for
the validation of any necessary changes. Since these
experts are in short supply (a requirement for the
successful development of an ES) , it is impossible to
capture a group of them and assign them to the software
support activity. Therefore, any maintenance plan must take
this into account and attempt to minimize the impacts of
having experts not readily available.
In order to accomplish this, it is proposed to utilize
the following approach. The software support facility will
perform all of the standard maintenance functions. Since
the DoD has created the DSMC to provide a reference center
for acquisition, it would appear obvious for them to be the
central focal point for support. The DSMC has a software
development group already in existence, working on the
procurement of software to assist program management. If
this approach were followed, at one location both the
software developers and maintainers and experts would be
collocated. In the author's opinion, this would be an
unusually logical arrangement that is seldom followed. This
organization would be able to do the necessary analysis of
problems, development of fixes, and testing of these fixes.
However, changes to the system should be approved at the
DoD acquisition policy maker level prior to release.
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Obviously, these policy makers will not be doing the coding
or testing of the changes, but approval of any changes
should require a sign off at this level, since they are
responsible for the implementation of the various
regulations and policies. This is even more critical for
this system since one primary goal of the system is to tutor
and train the new acquisition worker. The policy maker
should therefore ensure that the training tool is kept
accurate and reliable.
In summation, the maintenance of the acquisition ES will
almost certainly be a continuous and substantial effort. It
is therefore important to minimize this effort by planning
for maintenance during the development of the ES. The ES
development approach selected provides for the reduction of
the maintenance effort through the selection of tools
require a minimum number of personnel. The maintenance of
the knowledge base is more difficult and requires access to
a group of experts to validate any changes to the ES. The
use of the DSMC software research center, combined with
review by DoD acquisition policy makers should provide a
satisfactory approach to ensuring the maintenance of the ES.
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IV. EXPERT SYSTEM (ES) PROTOTYPE
A. INTRODUCTION
This section will describe the various issues involved
in the development of the prototype. It will attempt to
parallel the structure of the previous section to show how
some of the issues raised were addressed. The purpose of
this prototype is twofold. The first is to prove the
concept of applying ESs to acquisition, by providing a
working system. The second is to demonstrate that existing
Department of Defense (DoD) manuals can provide an useful
source of knowledge with out a large investment of resources
in developing the ES.
B . HARDWARE
Some people feel that the selection of hardware can be
isolated from all other considerations. While this can be
done it usually leads to increased development of tools that
do not exist for the selected hardware. Therefore, the
selection of hardware should be closely linked to the
software required to accomplish the task. This rule cannot
be forgotten if an efficient development environment is to
be established. Hardware with out software is useless and
vice versa, worse great hardware with bad software is worse
than a system consisting of average performance.
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Based on this, the selection of hardware for the
prototype was driven by three considerations. First was the
desire to select a hardware that was available to potential
users until the mainframe system is set up. The second was
the availability of software to run on the selected
hardware. The third was the ease of use and access during
the development of the prototype.
The first consideration led to the selection of a
Personal Computer (PC) based hardware suite. This is due to
the fact that almost all program offices have or have access
to a PC system. Furthermore, the selection was made to use
an IBM compatible system since the Government has selected
that as its office standard. A last, though not
inconsequential consideration was that the author owns an
IBM and is familiar with its architecture and operating
system.
As stated earlier, the second and third considerations
are closely interrelated. In order to find a suitable
hardware suite, it was necessary to determine the hardware
requirements of existing expert software. It would do no
good to select a hardware suite that was too exotic to
assemble. This led to a survey of existing commercial ES
shells. Several published references were utilized and
offered excellent comparison tables of existing software
tools (Waterman 1985:339-365; Wolfgram, Dear & Galbraith
1987:131; Defense Systems Management College 1986:2-2). The
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result of this survey was that there exist a number of ES
shells that are all capable of running on an IBM PC, and
that provide a suitable development environment. The most
exotic requirement of most was that of a hard disk for large
rule bases.
C. SOFTWARE
Based upon the above selection of hardware, a final
selection of software was made. The ES shell selected was
the M.l system by Teknowledge. The criterion for this
decision was based upon purely pragmatic reasons. The final
selection of the system was made strictly due to the fact
that M.l was available at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) . In addition, there existed sample programs developed
by NPS students. This greatly decreased the learning time
required for the author to develop a working control
structure.
To say this decision was pragmatic does not mean that
M.l is not a suitable choice. The M.l system, is a robust
ES shell, by any comparison to others on the market. M.l
allows for a rule base of virtually unlimited size, due to
the remove and load functions. It allows for the inclusion
of graphics, external routines written in the C programming
language, and allows for external calls to data files via
the operating system. In fact, the only real criticism of
M.l is that it does not generate executable code. The
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system is interpreted and therefore requires the user to own
M.l, however, this is offset by the fact that when running
M.l rules can be added and saved. One last point in M.ls
favor is that M.l was derived from a mainframe ES S.l, also
by Teknowledge. This means that the coding on a PC should
be very transportable to the mainframe version. If this
proves out it would give a very strong argument to examining
the use of S.l as the mainframe ES.
D. KNOWLEDGE BASE
In considering the knowledge base of the prototype, the
scope of the work involved became the paramount issue. The
restriction of one person attempting to develop the ES
prototype, quickly became apparent. This appeared to be
fatal restriction, since the purpose of prototype is to
quickly develop a partially working system. Therefore, the
first decision was to concentrate on the product portion of
the system. This is the portion that involves the use of
ESs, and development of this portion is needed to prove that
ESs can be utilized in DoD acquisition.
Yet a partially completed ES is not feasible, since
expertise is not partial. Therefore, in order to develop a
prototype that is usable, the author decided to concentrate
on a single module and attempt to complete the product
portion of it. This will allow for one specific functional
area to be supported. However, even one module posed a
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significant amount of work. Which module to select? Would
choosing the software module be better for a prototype than
choosing the hardware, or the costing modules? Even with
the selection of only one module, the amount of work
involved in developing the expert knowledge base and
validating it is substantial.
The solution for which module to develop came by
thinking about who in the program organization will bring in
new technology. More important, who will provide support
for the continued development of the entire system? Based
on these questions, it was decided to develop the product
portion of the program managers module. The reasoning
behind this is that the Program Manager (PM) is ultimately
responsible for the program and anything that can help
determine the state of his or her program will be more
readily accepted. Also, if the PM does not trust or accept
this technology, then use by his or her staff will probably
be limited. This logic is summed up in the line: impress
the boss first and the rest will follow.
The problem of the knowledge base still exists. This is
the real work in any ES. There has to be agreement on who
are the experts, then the knowledge must be extracted from
them, put into a working ES, and finally validated against
the experts to ensure the knowledge was not corrupted
somewhere along the line. This sequence of events is what
has led to long development times of large ESs. Faced with
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this, the development of a knowledge base to assist the PM
in determining the status of the program seemed almost too
ambitious.
However, a solution was found that eliminated the need
for determining experts, culling the data, and validating
the ES. The approach used was to take approved DoD manuals
that described typical problems encountered in acquisition
programs. Even more fortunate, these manuals also provided
detailed reasons why, and symptoms of the problems. The
fact that these manuals are approved by DoD means that they
can not be ruled inaccurate since the "experts" approved
them. Furthermore, since they describe typical problems and
not methodology, they are applicable to all programs. The
manuals selected were the DoD 4245. 7-M TRANSITION FROM
DEVELOPMENT TO PRODUCTION and the Department of the Navy
(DON) NAVSO P-6071 BEST PRACTICES.
An added benefit of the selection of these manuals is
the manner in which they are structured. These manuals were
broken up into the functional areas involved during the
transition development to production process. These
functional areas are: funding, design, test, production,
transition, facilities, logistics, and management. Each of
these areas was itself broken up into specific subareas or
topics. For example facilities consists of four topics:
modernization, factory improvements, and productivity
center. For each of these topics, an explanation of the
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topic is provided, and four of the most common traps
associated with that topic were identified. Each of these
traps is discussed by providing the present practice,
symptoms, corrective action, and benefits of the corrective
action.
The structure of these manuals provided for a fairly
easy ES development. The similarity of structure allows the
expert module for each topic to be structured the same. The
explanation for each topic can be inserted without
modification. The listing of the traps allows them to be
asked as questions, answerable by yes or no responses.
Appendix A illustrates this by containing a commented sample
of the main control structure and one module (transition)
.
Appendix B provides a user manual for installation and
operation.
Even with the selection of these manuals, there were a
number of difficulties encountered in deciding how to
develop the knowledge base. The resulting method was often
the selection of the method that would ease the development.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine if these
difficulties are critical or not until the prototype is
used. It should be remembered that none of these
difficulties are irreversible, and that the purpose of a
prototype is to quickly determine what works best.
One of the difficulties is the use of a standard
structure. This may allow for the user to "game" the ES.
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This was considered, but for the prototype, the goal is
education, not correction, therefore gaming should not be
that prevalent. If a similar structure is found to be
undesirable, each module can be restructured. This will
complicate the development, but will be transparent to the
user.
Before discussing any further difficulties, it is
necessary to discuss the term trap as used in the DoD
manuals. The DoN Best Practices manual provides the
following definition:
...these approaches, standard ways of doing business in
today's defense systems acquisition environment, as
"traps" since they represent potential danger to program
success. Although traps may not appear to be inherently
dangerous, they become problems when they are sprung.
There are indicators, or "alarms," both subtle and
obvious, which alert the project manager to the fact
that he is caught. On the other hand, the dangers of a
trap can be avoided if he knows how to "escape." The
project will immediately relate to the traps discussed
in this manual because with few exceptions he will find
them in his project. (U.S. Department of the Navy
1986:1-5)
What this definition says is that certain practices can
appear to be correct but in reality are a serious flaw when
used incorrectly. An example of this will make it clearer.
In the Transition Plan template, trap #1 states "Transition
plan is reviewed and approved by government at Milestone
III" (U.S. Department of the Navy 1986:7-2). This appears
not to be a trap, but a very good idea, for two reasons.
First, the Government required that a transition plan be
developed and second, the Government is reviewing the
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transition plan at the same time it is making the decision
for production. However, this is exactly the manner in
which this trap is sprung. The correct use of a transition
plan is to develop it early during the Full-Scale
Engineering Development (FSED) phase and to require its use
during the FSED phase.
These manuals provide the four most common traps that
are prevalent in each of the functional area templates. For
each trap in a template, a list of the escapes, along with
alarms are listed. If a template is used in the manner of
the escapes, it is not a trap. Conversely, if the alarms
are observed, then the project has a greater risk of
problems. In this manner, the manuals attempt to warn the
PM of the risks associated with even the "standard" manner
of acquisition. Only by understanding why something is
important, can the PM ensure that it is correctly employed.
This introduces the next difficulty. During the
research of the prototype, it was decided to use the trap
itself as the question vice the symptoms for the trap. This
approach was taken for two reasons. First, it allows the
structure to be the same, thus speeding development.
Second, it stresses the traps themselves. By asking the
trap as a question, it is hoped to stress that this trap
does occur. Whereas the same symptom can mean two or more
problems. Since each trap has a varying numbers of
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symptoms, this will mandate that each module be structured
uniquely.
The last difficulty is the verbatim use of the manual
descriptions of each topic. This could be construed as
providing a biased viewpoint and therefore limit the
learning ability of the user. Industry and DoD do have
different goals and viewpoints on development. By not
providing a "balanced" view, the user may be lead to believe
that the DoD view is the only method. This is a valid point
on the blanket use of DoD manuals. However, the DoN manual
was developed by a joint team of contractors and DoD
personnel and so this problem should be minimized.
E . INTERFACE
The choice of interface was determined by the lack of
time and experience in the use of M.l. Therefore, the
standard M.l interface panels consisting of questions and
answers was utilized. This is not to imply that M.l does
not allow for easy modification of its standard interface.
M.l is very flexible in this regard and as earlier mentioned
allows the use of graphics. There simply was not time to
learn the control aspects of this prototype and develop a
new interface.
Therefore, the format of the two manuals was used.
Parts of the manuals were used verbatim as the explanation
of the topic and the traps themselves were utilized as the
78
questions. However, one additional feature was added to the
manual format. This was the addition of an explanation
panel for each question. The reason for this is that many
of the traps, when phrased as questions, assume a level of
knowledge that may not be present in all users.
F. VALIDATION
As stated previously, the validation of an ES is crucial
to its acceptance and success. No one will use an ES that
makes mistakes. However, this is also the most difficult
part of the development of an ES. For the prototype, it was
decided to utilize published documents as the "experts".
This was done to bypass the difficult, time consuming task
of validation.
There is some justification for criticizing this
approach. Any source of expertise should be reviewed and
validated. However, the purpose of this prototype is to
demonstrate that existing knowledge can be incorporated into
ESs and provide help without a large development effort.
Granted this method does not provide tailored knowledge to a
particular program, but it does provide assistance to the
untrained acquisition personnel presently on the job. As a
follow on effort the tailoring of DoD manuals to specific
programs would be the next logical step and in this stage
validation will be very important.
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6. PROJECTED USE, MAINTENANCE, AND SUPPORT
The projected use of this prototype is as a training aid
until it can be incorporated into the entire ES. It is
hoped that this prototype will prove useful as is. If
nothing else, it provides another medium for disseminating
the knowledge contained in these DoD manuals. It should
serve as a good reference checklist or refresher for an
experienced PM.
A copy of this prototype and thesis will be given to
Department of Research and Information at the Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) . There it can be
evaluated with the other software development packages under
development. After that, any further dissemination, and
support will be determined by the DSMC.
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V. SUMMARY
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system has
been shown to be less than ideal in its ability to develop,
and produce new systems. One major cause of this has been
determined to be the lack of experienced personnel
.
Furthermore, a continued inability to acquire working
defense systems will become a greater threat to the national
security of the United States. The lack of experienced
personnel suggests that a computer based Decision Support
System/Expert System (DSS/ES) could assist existing
personnel in developing the required expertise in a
shortened timeframe.
An examination of the definitions of these systems and
the problem definition was made. A good fit was found that
would allow for application of an ES. In order to allow for
a rapid development of the system, the problem space was
limited to one service and one type of equipment. The
problem space was also limited to the operational and
management control areas, due to the higher probability of





/* Main controls the entire program. It allows the user to
specify the module of interest. The module is then loaded
and executed. The structure of each module is identical
except for the number of templates. Upon completion, the
loaded module is deleted, leaving the main program ready to
execute again. All rules are given a coded beginning
relating to its parent module. The R and CR suffixes are
used to distinguish between rules and control rules. All
rules are number in the same manner between modules.*/
/*BEGIN—main */




/* Set the object that the system will seek for*/
mainr-O:
goal = advice.
/* Maincr-1 is the main execution statement for the
program. Variables are requested in a set order in order to
determine program execution. The capital letters indicate
variables that take on the name of used in the loaded
module. This is unique to M.l and the user should read the
M.l technical manual before attempting to modify this.
Following rules support maincr-1.*/
maincr-1:
if querryl = Ql and
msg-Ql = M and
display (M) and
querry2-Ql = Q2 and
msg-Ql-Q2 = MO and
display (MO) and
exmsg-Ql-Q2 = M6 and
quescont is sought and
display (M6) and
msg-quesl-Q2 = Ml and
display(Ml) and
quesl-Q2 is known and
quesl-Q2 = Q3 and
msg-ques2-Q2 = M2 and
display (M2) and
ques2-Q2 is known and
ques2-Q2 = Q4 and
msg-ques3-Q2 = M3 and
display (M3) and
ques3-Q2 is known and
ques3-Q2 = Q5 and
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msg-ques4-Q2 = M4 and
display (M4) and
ques4-Q2 is known and
ques4-Q2 = Q6 and
9(01,02,03,04,05,06) = Q0
then advice = Q0.
/* Supports maincr-1. Prompts the user for the functional
area he is interested in.*/
maincr-3
:
question (querryl) = 'select the project area you want
advice on '
.
/* Provides list of possible answers.*/
mainr-1:legalvals(querryl) =
[ funding ,designl,design2 , test, production, logistics,
management , transition]
.
/* Used to provide a manual pause to allow the user to read
the message displayed. M.l does not have an automatic pause
for displaying information, therefore, a question must be
used. */
maincr-4
question (quescont) = 'Select "ready" to continue.'.
/* Provides list of possible answers.*/
mainr-4
:
legalvals (quescont) = [ready].
/* Main control rules 5 through 12 are used to find and
load the selected functional area code.*/
maincr-5:
whenfound (querryl =







'b:design2 . txt' ) ]
maincr-8




































/* This ends the main section of the program.*/
/* Transition is a functional area consisting of one
template. It is selected because of this fact. Other
functional area with more than one template operate exactly
as this one. The naming of rules follows the following
convention. The first letter designates the functional area
that is t for transition. The second letter ( and third if
required for uniqueness) designates the template, that is t
for transition.*//*BEGIN— transition section */
/* transition section control */
/* This message provides the user with the list of
templates he can choose from.*/
tcr-2
:
msg-transition = ['The following are what the











/* Prompts the user to select a template.*/
tcr-3:
question (guerry2-transition) = 'select the design area
you want advice on'.
/* Provides list of possible answers.*/
tr-l:
legalvals ( querry2-transition) = [tt] .
/* transition */
/* The first message provides user information describing
the template. OVERVIEW comes from the NAVSO P-6071 entry at
the beginning of each template. The TIMELINE comes from the
DoD 424 5. 7-M entry for each template. REFERENCE is added
based upon the developers expertise.*/
ttcr-O:
msg-transition-tt = ['OVERVIEW
The application of the principles briefly discussed in
the templates for design, test, and manufacturing is
necessary for the successful accomplishment of the
engineering tasks on schedule. Integrated with and
pervading this effort are the activities presented within
the templates for facilities, logistics, and management.
The scope and interactions for this multidisciplined
approach to risk reduction during development and production
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are significant. A transition plan (DoD 4245. 7-M) is
necessary to identify the timing and application of the
different disciplines, the risk-driving interrelationships,
and particularly how and when execution of the plan is to be
evaluated. To be effective the transition plan should be
available at the start of engineering development and
updated regularly until full production occurs.
TIMELINE
This effort begins prior to MS II and continues through
the start of production. A transition plan, which is a
comprehensive management plan describing all
production-related activities that must be accomplished
during design, test, and low rate initial production, is
needed to ensure a smooth transition from development to
full rate production. To be effective, the transition plan
should be available before the start of FSD and updated
regularly so that low rate production can be initiated at
minimal risk.
REFERENCE ',nl,nl].
/* This message is used to provide the user with the
textbook definition of the template. AREA OF RISK and
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISK comes from the DoD 4245. 7-M
section in each template.*/
ttcr-5:
exmsg-transition-tt = ['AREA OF RISK
In the past, a lack of formal transition planning has
contributed significantly to the problems encountered in the
transition from development to production. One of the major
causes has been a Government/ industry attitude that the
performance parameters must be achieved during engineering
development before expending funds to achieve production
objectives. While there were a number of milestone-oriented
Government requirements during the development phase and
before the start of production, these were really
stand-alone requirements generally used to verify the
designs performance goals or as negotiation materials not
having a smooth transition as an end objective.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISK
1) Formal Government policies and specified contractual
requirements that lay the groundwork for planning,
programming, and executing specific actions during the
development phase to ensure a smooth and successful
transition to production are set forth in DoD Directive
4245.6 and DoD Directive 4245.7.
2) The Government program manager is required to fund
and execute a contractor-developed transition plan,
initially prepared no later that the start of engineering
development and continually updated until rate production is
achieved.
3) A sample transition plan outline includes, but is
not limited to, consideration of all templates in this
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Manual. The transition plan integrates the design, test,
and manufacturing activities in order to reduce data
requirements, duplication of effort, costs, and schedule.
It identifies, for example, test and manufacturing issues
that impact design, and design issues that affect test and
manufacturing. The transition plan is a major means of
implementing the manufacturing strategy described in one of
the management templates.
4) Development contracts contain the requirement for a
formal design-to-unit production cost program and provisions
for proof of manufacturing methods and processes. Funding
is provided to the contractors for these areas of activity.
5) Formal Production Readiness Reviews (PRRs) are
conducted jointly by the customer and the contractor during
the development effort and completed before the production
decision. Participants in these reviews are qualified and
experienced both in technical aspects of the product and the
manufacturing processes proposed to produce it. PRRs,
properly staffed and conducted, will result in both
Government and contractor benefits. Government policy and
procedures on conducting PRRs are contained in DoD
Instruction 5000.38. ',nl,nl].
/* This next series of questions are the 4 traps form the
NAVSO manual. Each trap is asked and the user is allowed to
answer yes or no. The msg associated with each question is
for providing extra explanation of the question. Presently,
these are blank.*/
ttcr-1:
question (quesl-tt)= 'Was the transition plan reviewed and
approved by the Government at, just before, or after MS
III?'.
ttr-1:
leqalvals (quesl-tt) = [yes,no].
ttcr-8:





question (ques2-tt) =' Is the transition plan developed and
reviewed only at the contractor program office level?'.
ttr-2:





question (ques3-tt)=' Is the transition plan only required
in the contract and is not viewed as a corporate policy?'.
ttr-3:
legalvals(ques3-tt) = [yes, no],
ttcr-10:









legalvals(ques4-tt) = [yes, no].
ttcr-11:




/* transition data list */
/* This portion contains the responses based upon the
answers given to the four questions. The selection is based
upon the functional area, the template code, and the
yes/no/unknown responses. Only one yes is allowed in order
to uniquely get a response. Unknowns or multiple yes
responses will send the user to the reference section.*/
ttdr-1:
g (transition , tt, no, no, no, no) = 'no traps found'.
ttdr-2
:
g(transition, tt,yes,no,no,no) = 'Trap #1 found
ALARM: Contractor fails to generate and use the transition
plan prior to production start up.
CONSEQUENCES: Much of the benefit of transition planning is
lost.
ESCAPES: Contractor should prepare and use a transition
plan during early FSD.




g(transition,tt,no,yes,no,no) = 'Trap #2 found
ALARM: Transition plan is developed only by the contractor
project office.
CONSEQUENCES: Transition plan may be limited in scope.
ESCAPES: Review and approve transition plan at corporate
level
.
BENEFITS: Corporate resources will be available to support
the transition plan. '.
ttdr-4
g(transition,tt,no,no,yes,no) = 'Trap #3 found
ALARM: (1) Manufacturing plan is presented as a transition
plan.
(2) Primarily production processes and equipment
are addressed by transition plan
CONSEQUENCES: The government pays for a transition plan but
does not get one.
ESCAPES: Reflect an integrated corporate strategy in the
transition plan:
- Collocation of manufacturing and design team
- Make or buy decisions
- Capital investment considerations
- Personnel recruiting and retention





g(transition,tt,no,no,no,yes) = 'Trap #4 found
ALARM: Contractor expects to achieve the 80
learning curve by improving worker skills.
CONSEQUENCES: Process is extremely slow and costly.
ESCAPES: Contractor should define
transition plan.
BENEFITS: Learning process will not
ttdr-6:




about transition since you answered all
with unknown. Try using the reference
program to get to where you can answer the
ttdr-8:
g (transition , tt , ANY1 , ANY2 , ANY3 , ANY4 ) =
percent
and fully implement a
be required. '
.
= 'all 4 traps found'.





'Can not tell. A
Please read
for further
combination of traps and/or unknown responses.
DoD 4245. 7-M (pg 2-1) and NAVSO P-6071 (3-1)
information and help.'.
/*END transition section */
/* After the end of each of the modules a short amount of
the main control section is present. This remainder is
required to be here so that M.l will not seek the default
responses first. If the user does not respond in the
correct manner, ie, yes or no. His response is converted to
mm here. If this code is moved M.l will find the default














/* In order for the
code goes here */
mainr-9
whenfound (advice)
tcr-3) , do (remove
ttcr-5) , do (remove
ttcr-8) , do (remove
ttcr-9) , do (remove
ttcr-10) , do (remove
ttcr-11) , do (remove
ttdr-3) , do (remove










program to be emptied a set of removal
= [ do ( remove
tr-1) , do (remove
ttcr-1) , do (remove
ttcr-2) , do (remove
ttcr-3) , do (remove
ttcr-4) , do (remove
ttdr-1) , do (remove
ttdr-4) , do (remove




















mainr-5) , do (remove mainr-6) , do (remove mainr-7) , do (remove





Installation, and Hardware Requirements
This prototype requires the M.l system and the required
hardware to execute it. Please see the M.l technical manual
for this information. The only peculiar installation for
this prototype is that rules in the main file "maincr-5"
through "maincr-12" must reflect the correct directory or
drive in order to find the modules. According to the user's
desires the modules can be loaded into any drive or
directory as long as the above rules are changed to reflect
the correct location.
The user modifies these rules by entering M.l and
loading the file named "PR0GT1. FST" (See below section).
After loading this file press the "F10" key to enter the
menu panels. Using the cursors move to the menu panel named
"Knowledge Base" (second form the left) , and move down to
edit an entry. Press enter and M.l will ask for a rule
name. Type in "MAINCR-5" and return. M.l will then call up
this rule and display it. Move the cursor to the
appropriate section and replace the drive or directory.
CAUTION, M.l is particular about the single quotes ''. Only
use the single quote to begin and end the location. DO NOT
CHANGE ANY brackets or parenthesis. Upon completion of the
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change, press "F10" to enter the change. Repeat this until
rules 5 through 12 are correct.
Upon completion of the changes, press "F10" again and go
to the knowledge base panel. Select the save kb in fast
format is highlighted, press enter. M.l will prompt you for
a file name. At this time enter single quote, drive letter,
colon, directory information, and the main program file name
"PR0GT1.FST", single quote. After checking this, press
enter and M.l will save the file as modified. If the quotes
are not used M.l will save the file to the default drive and
directory. This is not serious but is very scary and
annoying. At this time the program is ready to execute.
It is never a good idea to load application files in the
same directory or disk drive as the program files.
Therefore, this manual assumes that the user has loaded this
prototype into a different directory or disk drive.
Operation
This program requires the M.l system to be installed.
The user starts the M.l program by either typing "Ml"
,
invoking an already installed autoexecution file, or via a
menu selection program. Once M.l is running the user must
load the main program file. This is accomplished by
pressing the alt key and "L" simultaneously. M.l will read
the default drive and directory and display the file names.
At this point M.l will allow the user to press the "F2" key
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for an alternate directory or drive. In the same provided
type the directory or disk drive that the prototype software
is loaded in. After pressing "RET", M.l will read the newly
designated directory or drive. The filenames will appear
with the first file highlighted. By using the cursor keys,
move the highlighting to the file named "PR0GT1.FST"
,
press
enter and M.l will proceed to load the file. While loading
a loading sign will flash in the lower right hand corner of
the screen. Upon completion, this sign will return to a
non-flashing ready.
The user is now ready to begin the consultation. By
pressing the alt key and the "G" key simultaneously, M.l
will begin executing the program. The program will prompt
the user for the functional area of interest. Selection is
made via the cursor keys and pressing return. Upon
selection, M.l will proceed to locate and load the
functional module code. The user may now respond to the
questions in the appropriate manner. WARNING M.l allows for
the use of "unknown" responses. This prototype will trap
those responses but not give the user any useful advice. A
feature for providing a reference section for unknown
responses is being worked on.
After completing the four questions, the program will
return a ready sign in the lower right hand corner. This
signifies that the session is complete. M.l still has the
main program module loaded in its rule base. This allows
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the user to restart the prototype by merely pressing alt key
and "G" again. However, if any of the larger modules have
been executed, M.l will have insufficient memory to allow
another large module to be run. This is due to the fact
that the variables form the previous module are not zeroed
out. Therefore, if the user attempts to execute another
module M.l may issue a memory error and return to DOS. To
date the only way found to avoid this is to exit M.l and
reenter it.
A final note, the entire command structure of M.l is
enabled during the consultation. Any valid M.l commands may
be issued. In particular the scroll function command "F2"
is necessary to read certain of the screens. Upon reading
the user presses the esc key and M.l resumes operation.
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